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Liability for personal injuries arising from
recreational services: The interaction of
contract, tort, State legislation and the
Trade Practices Act and the resultant mess
Joachim Dietrich*
Recent changes to the Trade Practices Act and to State tort law regimes
have significantly altered the law on liability arising from personal injury
incurred in the course of participation in recreational services. In particular,
where a service provider seeks to waive liability for negligence and breach
of contract, the interaction between the TPA, the common law of contract
and torts, and State legislation, has led to excessive complexity. In the
context of recreational services, the article suggests that recent ‘tort reforms’
are a failure according to the criteria of consistency and simplicity.
1. Introduction
There has been a significant sea-change in Australian torts law over the last
two years or so as a raft of ‘reforms’ have been enacted by State and federal
parliaments. The driving force behind these developments has been a public
liability insurance ‘crisis’, in the form of dramatically rising insurance
premiums and, in relation to some activities, liability insurance being
unobtainable altogether. Widely held public opinion, fuelled by insurance
industry claims, has laid the blame for such ‘crisis’ on the torts system and,
specifically, on (i) increasing numbers of claims and a more litigious society
generally (with claims often being made by plaintiffs who are perceived to be
‘undeserving’ in the sense of being largely responsible for their own harms);
(ii) a ready willingness by courts to find negligence on the part of defendants
and; (iii) excessively ‘generous’ tort damages awards.1 In response to this
highly politically-charged debate, Commonwealth and State ministers set up
the Negligence Review Panel, chaired by Justice Ipp, to inquire into the
problem and suggest solutions.2 The final report of the panel (the Ipp Report)
recommended numerous reforms to the law governing personal injury claims.
Since then (and, indeed, even before the final report) many changes to the law
have been proposed and introduced into legislatures. Some of these proposals
have already become law.
* Faculty of Law, ANU. I would like to thank Professor Jim Davis for his ideas and input in
the course of our discussions of this topic and for his comments on an earlier draft. I would
also like to thank the anonymous referee for drawing my attention to a number of helpful
cases.
1 Compare the perceived causes of the torts law problems identified by the Commonwealth of
Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report, October 2002, p 25, § 1.6. The
report can be accessed at <revofneg.treasury.gov.au> (the Ipp Report). This perception is
perhaps ironic given that since before the ‘insurance crisis’ there has been an apparent
change in sentiment in the High Court in its approach to tort law, with a trend towards more
pro-defendant decisions. See H Luntz, ‘Torts Turnaround Downunder’ (2001) 1 Oxford Uni
Cth L Jnl 95.
2 Ipp Report, ibid.
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The purpose of this article is to consider only one focus of the legislative
changes, namely, personal injuries (or death) arising in the course of
participation in recreational services. In particular, the focus will be on cases
in which ‘recreational’ service providers seek to incorporate a waiver clause
into the contract of service, whereby participants waive their rights to sue for
personal injury damages for breach of contract and negligence.
At least two factors appear to have driven calls for reforms to allow
operators of recreation businesses to restrict their liability and, conversely, for
participants in such activities to take responsibility for their own actions and
any consequent injuries. First, a number of high profile torts cases, in which
plaintiffs engaging in inherently risky activities successfully sued for
damages, received considerable media publicity.3 Secondly, one manifestation
of the insurance crisis has been increasing liability insurance premiums. From
the period June 2001 to May 2002, for example, premium increases averaged
22%,4 with some industries, such as outdoor sport and recreation, particularly
hard hit, facing premium increases in the range of 100–500%.5 As a result, it
has been asserted, the survival of many small businesses is threatened,
particularly in the tourism and recreation industry.6 In response to the crisis,
federal and State legislation has been passed, instituting significant changes to
both tort law generally and changes to the law with a particular focus on
recreational services.
At first blush, the focus of this article may seem unduly narrow, but it is an
area of practical importance, given that many injuries occur in the course of
sports and leisure activities, especially in a society in which adventure sports
and tourism are becoming increasingly popular.7 More importantly, however,
a consideration of the law on recreational services will illustrate the disastrous
state of affairs we have reached even before the ink is dry on much of the
relevant legislation.8 It will become evident that the interaction between the
3 Eg, in Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (NSW SC, 13 May 2002, unreported) a body
surfer successfully sued the council for failing to warn of the possibility of shifting sandbars
under the water between the flags at an ocean beach. There was much media and political
debate generated by the decision in New South Wales. The iconic status attained by the
decision amongst the ‘tort reform’ lobby is ironic given that it was overturned on appeal:
Waverley Municipal Council v Swain (2003) Aust Torts Reps 81-694. Interestingly, the
original decision overturned by the Court of Appeal was a jury verdict.
4 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Second insurance industry market
pricing review, September 2002, p viii (statistics available at <http://www.accc.gov.au>).
Thanks to D Koc, Public Liability Insurance ‘Crisis’: Fact or Fiction, unpublished ANU
Honours Thesis, 2002, for drawing my attention to this. The references in nn 5–6 below are
also sourced from this thesis, pp 14–16.
5 Office of Small Business — Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Submission to
the Senate Economic References Committee Inquiry into the impact of public liability and
professional indemnity insurance cost increases, May 2002, p 4.
6 Trowbridge Consulting, Public Liability Insurance — Practical Proposals for Reform,
30 May 2002, at <http://www.trowbridge.com.au/>, p 4. Despite recent law reforms, the
problem does not seem to have abated, with the continuing closure of small ‘recreational’
service businesses. See S Strutt, ‘Tour Groups Forced Into Liability Wilderness’, Australian
Financial Review, 28 July 2003.
7 See, eg, the statistics cited by McHugh J in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002)
208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [62], that in 1995, 228,800 persons had sport or recreational
activity related injuries in the month immediately prior to a health survey.
8 All States, except South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have passed legislation
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Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), contract law, tort law and different
State legislation operating in the context of injuries sustained by plaintiffs
while participating in recreational services is complex; factual differences
such as whether the plaintiff is a minor or adult, whether the defendant is a
corporation or not, the State in which the recreational activity takes place and
whether it is ‘dangerous’ or the risks which eventuated are ‘obvious’, will
have significant impact upon a plaintiff’s chances of success. Further, as will
be seen below, legal complications new to tort litigation are set to arise, for
example, whether State legislation is consistent with provisions of the TPA.
These consequences are ironic, given that the first recommendation of the
Ipp Report was that its recommendations be incorporated ‘in a single statute
. . . to be enacted in each jurisdiction’.9 This recommendation was based on
the Ipp Report’s ‘unqualified’ support for the aspiration of developing a
‘consistent national approach . . . to bring the law in all Australian
jurisdictions as far as possible into conformity’.10 The enactment of the
recommended provisions was aimed at achieving ‘uniformity’ and
‘consistency’.11 Not only were State legislatures to uniformly implement the
proposals, it was also proposed in Recommendation 2 that:
The Proposed Act should be expressed to apply (in the absence of express provision
to the contrary) to any claim for damages for personal injury or death resulting from
negligence regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, contract, under a
statute or any other cause of action.12
With all due respect, even if (and it was a big if, given the controversial
nature of the subject matter) the State legislatures adopted both these
which implements a significant proportion of the Ipp Report recommendations. The various
Acts are considered further below. Although the WA Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2003
(amending the Civil Liability Act 2002) has received only its second reading in the
Legislative Council on 26 June, this article proceeds on the assumption that the legislation
will be passed. It should be noted that the Tasmanian Civil Liability Amendment Act 2003
was assented to only on 4 July 2003. Victoria has passed the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public
Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002, which contains amendments to the Goods Act to
similar effect to s 68B of the TPA, both of which are considered further below; and the
Wrongs and Limitations of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003, which deals with
some aspects of the Ipp Report but does not comprehensively implement the
recommendations. South Australia has passed the Recreational Services (Limitation of
Liability) Act 2002, which is relevant to this article. Although the Law Reform (Ipp
Recommendations) Bill 2003 is before the SA Parliament, and contains a significant part of
the Ipp Report recommendations, the Bill does not specifically deal with recreational
services. Hence, unless otherwise noted below, the Bill will not be considered. At the time
of writing, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory have not passed
legislation implementing the bulk of the Ipp Report recommendations. (The Personal
Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) is essentially procedural and the Personal Injuries
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) only deals in part with reforms which are the
subject of the Ipp Report’s recommendations). I do not propose to consider the position in
the Territories: the law relating to recreational services is complex enough with a focus on
seven jurisdictions. In any case, the relevant law of the Territories may be simpler, given that
the TPA applies to all contracts entered into in the course of trade and commerce within
those jurisdictions.
9 Ipp Report, above n 1, Recommendation 1, p 1.
10 Ibid, p 26.
11 Ibid p 35.
12 Ibid, p 1, Recommendation 2.
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recommendations, it was always a doubtful, even misconceived, proposition
that uniformity and consistency could be achieved by adopting
Recommendation 2. This is because of the complex interaction between
common law, State legislation and the TPA; the combinations and
permutations of which are labyrinthine. This is borne out by the discussion of
the law governing recreational services that is the subject of this article. In any
case, as it turns out, the States have not uniformly adopted the Ipp Report’s
recommendations: there are considerable differences between the various Acts
passed by the States, some seemingly minor, others significant. The result of
the ‘reform’ process put in place by the Ipp Report, it is suggested, is a failure
according to the criteria of consistency and simplicity, at least in relation to
recreational services. Complexity is the only certainty; more litigation the
only certain consequence. Whether this conclusion is also valid for the reform
package as a whole remains to be seen.
I will commence with a consideration of the background to personal injury
claims provided by the TPA, where that Act is applicable, and the recent
amendments to that Act in the context of recreational services.
2. Cases in which the TPA applies: The operation of
s 74 and recent reforms
A person injured in the course of recreational activities may be able to sue the
defendant provider of such services either in negligence or for breach of
contract. In relation to the latter, such a claim is possible either for breach of
an express term of the contract13 or else for breach of an implied term. In
particular, where a plaintiff consumer (as defined in s 4B of the TPA)14 enters
a contract for the provision of recreational services with a defendant who is a
‘corporation’ (as defined in s 4, or whose conduct otherwise falls within the
more extended operation of the TPA under s 6),15 then s 74 implies a term into
such contract that the services will be ‘rendered with due care and skill’ and
that any materials supplied in connection with the service be ‘reasonably fit
for the purpose’.16 (For convenience, I will refer merely to the obligation as
one of ‘due care and skill’.) Further, s 68 of the TPA provides that any term
of a contract that seeks to exclude, restrict or modify the application of s 74
is void. Prior to the passage of s 68B of the TPA, there were no exceptions to
this non-excludability.17 Perhaps surprisingly, given the limited capacity of
13 Eg, Mouritz v Hegedus (WA FC, 19 April 1999, unreported, BC9901806); affirming the
decision of Hegedus v Mouritz (1997) 18 SR (WA) 327.
14 The discussion which follows will proceed on the basis that service contracts are entered
with a consumer.
15 For simplicity’s sake, the term ‘corporation’ will be used throughout, but is intended to
include non-corporate defendants whose conduct brings them within the operation of the
TPA under s 6.
16 I am assuming for the purposes of this article that a failure to act with ‘due care and skill’
equates with carelessness, that is, a breach of duty, in tort. Hence, a breach of a duty of care
will also be a breach of s 74 or its State equivalents, and vice versa.
17 See, however, s 68A which allows for terms of contracts limiting liability, in relation to
services performed in breach of contract, to the resupply of the services or the costs of such
resupply (s 68A (1)(b)), unless it is not ‘fair or reasonable’ for a corporation to rely on such
term (ss (2)). I do not know whether such limitation clauses are in common use but where
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suppliers of services to restrict their liability for breach of s 74, most claims
for personal injury in the past generally appear to have been brought in
negligence, rather than contract.18 None the less, the presence of s 68 no doubt
indirectly facilitates such tort claims: the absence of an enforceable exclusion
clause in contracts of service also means that tort claims in negligence are not
excluded. It should be added that Victoria, South Australia and Western
Australia have equivalent provisions that are not limited in their application to
corporations.19
Trade Practices Act amendments: s 68B
In December 2002, as part of the Federal Government’s response to the
perceived insurance and torts law ‘crisis’, s 68B became part of the TPA. The
stated purpose of s 68B is to ‘permit self-assumption of risk by individuals
who choose to participate in inherently risky activities, and [to] allow them to
waive their rights under the’ TPA.20 The section provides:
Limitation of liability in relation to supply of recreational services
(1) A term of a contract for the supply by a corporation of recreational services is
not void under section 68 by reason only that the term excludes, restricts or modifies,
or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:
(a) the application of section 74 to the supply of the recreational services under
the contract; or
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by section 74 in relation to the supply of the
recreational services under the contract; or
(c) any liability of the corporation for a breach of a warranty implied by
section 74 in relation to the supply of the recreational services under the
contract;
a plaintiff suffers personal injury as a result of the negligent performance of the services,
I suggest that it would not be fair or reasonable to rely on such a limitation clause. Support
for this view can be found in the operation of the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). See,
eg, John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (NSW CA, 18 December 1996,
unreported, BC9606183), in which a wide-ranging exclusion clause excluding liability for
personal injury sustained at a gymnasium was held to be ‘unjust’ in its width of operation
when considered alongside the circumstances in which the contract had been entered.
Contrast Gowan v Hardie (NSW CA, 18 November 1991, unreported, BC9102718), where
the existence of a wide-ranging exclusion clause was not a factor that on its own rendered
the contract ‘unjust’ in the circumstances (trainee parachutist suffering injury from
defendants’ negligence). See also the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK), under which
clauses excluding liability for negligence have been deemed ‘unfair’. See E Macdonald,
Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Terms, Butterworths, London, 1999, pp 198–9, 203–4.
18 See, eg, the very small number of cases listed under s 74 in R V Miller, Miller’s Annotated
Trade Practices Act, 24th ed, Lawbook Co, 2003, p 520. This is despite the fact that such
negligence claims potentially at least could be met with a contractual waiver clause should
such exist.
19 The equivalent sections to s 74 and s 68 are, respectively: Consumer Transactions Act 1972
(SA) ss 7 and 8; Goods Act 1958 (Vic) ss 91–92 and 95 (as a result of the Fair Trading Act
Amendment Act 2003 (Vic), these provisions will be incorporated into the Fair Trading Act
1999 (Vic) and repealed from the Goods Act; the relevant sections are ss 32J–32JA and
32L–32LA); and Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) ss 34 and 40. In New South Wales, although
no ss 68 and 74 equivalent applies, a plaintiff may seek to overcome the effects of a waiver
clause by relying on the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), as in John Dorahy’s Fitness
Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (NSW CA, 18 December 1996, unreported, BC9606183).
20 Explanatory Memorandum provided with the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for
Recreational Services) Bill 2002 (Cth).
248 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
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so long as:
(d) the exclusion, restriction or modification is limited to liability for death or
personal injury; and
(e) the contract was entered into after the commencement of this section.
‘Recreational services’ are defined for the purposes of the section as
meaning services that consist of participation in:
(a) a sporting activity or a similar leisure-time pursuit; or
(b) any other activity that:
(i) involves a significant degree of physical exertion or physical risk; and
(ii) is undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or leisure.
For convenience, I will label any term that seeks to exclude, restrict or
modify liability for breach of s 74 a waiver clause. A number of important
points need to be made about the operation of this section and related matters.
First, the effect of s 68B is to allow for contractual waivers of liability for
breaches of s 74. Clearly, s 68B envisages that defendant corporations may
thus exclude liability for the negligent performance of services or supply of
unfit goods. Such a waiver clause in most cases, if it successfully excludes
liability for conduct amounting to a breach of s 74 (that is, the performance of
a service without ‘due care and skill’) will also exclude liability for any tort
claims in negligence; that is, for breach of a duty of care.21 If a waiver clause
is not effective in excluding liability for breach of s 74, either because it has
not been validly incorporated into a contract, or is not interpreted to extend to
an exclusion of liability for negligent conduct, then a claim for breach of the
contract will be available against a defendant service provider who is a
corporation. In such a case, even if the ‘waiver’ might still operate to exclude
tort liability (with knowledge of the waiver providing evidence of a voluntary
assumption of risk),22 such operation is irrelevant given the plaintiff’s right to
21 See above n 16; this assumption again is necessary for the sake of simplicity, but is probably
in any case a reasonable one. Note, however, John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v
Buchanan (NSW CA, 18 December 1996, No 40386/94, unreported, BC9606183), in which
Mahoney P considered that a waiver clause successfully excluded liability in tort, but not for
breach of an implied term of a contract to use reasonable care and skill to provide safe
premises and equipment.
22 It has been held that a non-contractual ‘waiver’ may none the less take effect as a voluntary
assumption of risk. See, eg, Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All ER 1145 and Bennett v Tugwell
[1971] 2 QB 267. If, however, knowledge of the waiver is evidence of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or there is otherwise contributorily negligent conduct,
then the legislative abrogation of the High Court’s decision in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999)
197 CLR 1; 161 ALR 155 probably means that damages will be reduced even if the claim
is brought in contract. The relevant State legislation provides, in effect, that a ‘wrong’ for
which a reduction in damages may be made now includes breaches of contractual duties of
care which are ‘concurrent and co-extensive with’ duties of care in tort. See Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 2001 (ACT); Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Amendment Act 2000 (NSW); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Amendment Act 2001 (NT); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Amendment Act 2001
(Qld); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001
(SA); Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence Amendment Act 2000 (Tas); Wrongs
(Amendment) Act 2000 (Vic); and Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’
Contribution) Amendment Act (WA) 2001.
The reason for my doubts on this latter point stems from the possibility of such provisions
being inconsistent with ss 68 and 74 of the TPA. See n 24 below, and text below at nn 44–51.
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sue for breach of contract. This is so on the assumption that a failure to act
with ‘due care and skill’ equates with carelessness, that is, a breach of duty,
in torts.
Importantly, if the recreational service provider is a corporation and liability
for breach of s 74 has not been waived, then this means that any State
legislative provisions which seek to limit the liability of recreational service
providers will also be ineffective. This follows from the inconsistency
between State and federal statutory rights, a point which will be discussed
further below. It suffices for now to say that the High Court in Wallis v
Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd23 has taken a broad approach
to the question of inconsistency between the TPA and State legislation, such
that any limitation of liability in State legislation will be inconsistent with the
full (and under s 68 non-excludable) contractual liability for breach created by
s 74.24
Hence, for example, although statutory provisions in New South Wales,
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia all purport to exclude liability by
defendant service providers to plaintiffs who have been injured as a result of
the occurrence of an obvious risk while engaged in ‘dangerous recreational
activities’,25 such provisions would not limit liability if there was any lack of
due care or skill on the part of the defendants amounting to a breach of s 74;
that is, if plaintiffs can show negligence. The prospect of inconsistent rights
arising from State and federal legislation is one of the minefield of
complexities that must now be negotiated as a result of the ‘reforms’ relating
to recreational services.
Secondly, although various State legislative provisions also deal with
recreational services, and these will be discussed further below, the definitions
adopted from State to State differ. The NSW and WA definitions appear wider
than the TPA definitions, as they do not require there to be any element of
physical exertion or risk in leisure pursuits;26 the Tasmanian definition is
similar in effect, albeit more brief in its wording;27 the Victorian and SA
definitions are identical to that of the TPA;28 and s 18 of Queensland’s Civil
Liability Act 2003 only has a definition of dangerous recreational activities,
meaning ‘an activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure that
involves a significant degree of risk of physical harm to a person’. Despite
these different definitions, however, I will assume that the meaning of
‘recreational services’ in all jurisdictions is the same. There is, of course, no
basis for such an assumption, since the different language adopted may well
lead to significantly different outcomes; given the absence of any authority on
the point, however, and more importantly, for the sake for simplicity, such an
23 (1994) 179 CLR 388; 120 ALR 440.
24 One interesting, indeed startling, possibility, however, is that the decision in Wallis will
extend to override State limitations in the form of reduced damages as a result of
contributory negligence and that the legislation cited above in n 22 might be held to be
inconsistent with ss 68 and 74 where no effective waiver operates.
25 Some of the relevant provisions will be discussed further below.
26 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5K and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5E respectively.
27 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 19.
28 Goods Act 1954 (Vic) s 97A (and Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) s 32N; see above n 19) and
Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) s 3 (1) respectively (note also
subs (2)).
250 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
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assumption is necessary in order to proceed with the discussion below.
Obviously, however, if such assumption proves incorrect then the
complexities noted below are significantly multiplied.
Thirdly, the focus on leisure-time pursuits and activities for ‘recreational
enjoyment’ may mean that some sporting and physical activities are not
covered, for example, an exercise and sports regime prescribed by a
physiotherapist as part of ongoing treatment and rehabilitation. This raises the
question of whether the purpose for which a participant undertakes a physical
activity (such as swimming) is a relevant consideration in defining
recreational services. If so, the rights to compensation of several participants
in the same activity could conceivably differ.
Fourthly, in allowing for contractual waivers, s 68B does not set out how
such a waiver is to be effectively worded and incorporated into a service
contract. Hence, it is the applicable common law principles of contract as to
the incorporation of terms, valid waivers, and interpretation of such terms, to
which one needs to turn. That is the topic for the next section.
Contractual waivers
It is outside the scope of this article to consider in detail the relevant contract
principles governing waivers. Two preliminary points can be made quite
briefly. First, the law as to the incorporation of exclusion clauses into contracts
is not straightforward. Incorporation by notice (the ‘ticket’ cases) may be
difficult, especially where the term is particularly harsh and oppressive.29
Even where an ostensibly contractual document has been signed and there is
a presumption that the terms thereof are binding (L’Estrange v F Graucob
Ltd),30 an exclusion clause may not be binding, or may not take effect to the
full extent of its terms, if there has been any misrepresentation in relation to
its effect or meaning,31 as evidenced by the famous case of Curtis v Chemical
Cleaning & Dyeing Co.32 Secondly, even if the clause is part of the contract,
the courts have traditionally taken a cautious approach to interpreting such
clauses too widely, so that an exclusion clause may not be effective to exclude
liability for negligence, or a serious breach of contract,33 unless the words
unambiguously encompass such conduct.
The discussion which follows is predicated on the assumption that a waiver
clause has been successfully incorporated into a contract and that its wording
29 See, eg, Interphoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programs Ltd [1989] 2 QB 433
at 443.
30 [1934] 2 KB 394; [1934] All ER Rep 16. Compare Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Pty Ltd v
Iliadis [1998] 4 VR 661.
31 Though note the discussion below in relation to proposed amendments to the TPA
concerning claims for personal injury under s 52.
32 [1951] 1 KB 805; [1951] 1 All ER 631.
33 See, eg, Mouritz v Hegedus [1999] WASCA 1061 (WA FC, 19 April 1999, unreported,
BC9901806), a decision which must be questioned, however, because of its reference to
‘fundamental breaches’ of contract (see the discussion in Professor J Davis, ‘Protecting the
Providers of Recreational Services’, unpublished paper delivered to the ‘Insurance Law and
Liability 2003’ Conference, held at Sydney, March 2003, pp 11–13). Contrast the views of
Mahoney P with those of Cole J as to the operation of the exclusion clause in John Dorahy’s
Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (NSW CA, 18 December 1996, unreported,
BC9606183); and compare Neill v Fallon (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-321.
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extends to excluding liability for the type of conduct in question. Even where
this is the case, however (and the difficulties of making such a determination
ought not to be underestimated), further difficulties arise. It is to these I now
turn.
Minors
One complication that arises from the common law of contractual waivers is
that minors are not generally bound by contracts they enter or which are
entered (by parents or guardians) on their behalf.
At common law, a minor does not have capacity to contract unless the
contract is one for necessary goods or (relevantly here) services and, further,
even if the contract is for necessaries, such as a contract for transportation to
and from work, the contract as a whole must be of benefit to the minor.34 For
example, in Flower v London & North Western Railway Company,35
a necessary contract for transportation of an infant to and from work was none
the less not binding upon him as it was detrimental; specifically, the contract
had sought to exclude the liability of the railway company for any accident,
injury or losses occasioned by the company, even by their negligence. In any
case, it will be a rare situation where a contract for recreational services will
be considered necessary unless, perhaps, it relates to the provision of
educational holiday camps, or sports training, for example. Even if such a
contract were considered for necessaries, the presence of exclusion clauses of
the type foreshadowed by the TPA almost certainly renders the contract not
one that as a whole is for the benefit of the minor. In New South Wales, the
position under the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 would not
appear to be different: although contracts generally beneficial to a minor are
binding,36 it is doubtful whether a service contract containing a wide-ranging
exclusion clause would be so, especially where the services are of a
recreational nature.
Even if a contract of (recreational) services is signed by a parent or guardian
on the minor’s behalf, it is not likely to be binding. The status of parent or
guardian does not carry with it any power to act on the minor’s behalf.37 There
appears to be little authority on the point, but Young J affirmed this position
in Homestake Gold of Australia Ltd v Peninsula Gold Pty Ltd.38 Further, even
though minors have power at common law (and under s 46 of the NSW Act)
to appoint agents, the acts of such agents have no greater validity against the
34 See D J Harland, The Law of Minors in Relation to Contract and Property, Butterworths,
Sydney, 1974, Ch 2, at [603]–[614]; and N C Seddon and M P Ellinghaus, Cheshire &
Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 7th Aust ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1997, at [17.13]–[17.16].
35 [1894] 2 QB 65. See also Keays v Great Southern Railway Co [1941] IR 534; Harnedy v
National Greyhound Racing Company Ltd [1944] IR 160, and compare Clements v London
& North Western Railway Co [1894] 2 QB 483, where the common law liability was validly
excluded alongside provisions for no-fault insurance cover. In a case not dealing with
exclusion clauses, Fawcett v Smethurst (1914) 84 LJKB 473, a term of a contract imposing
strict liability for loss of a car in a (necessary) car hire contract rendered the contract too
onerous and hence unenforceable.
36 See Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 34, at [17.43]–[17.50].
37 See Harland, above n 34, at [201].
38 (1996) 131 FLR 447 at 456; 20 ACSR 67.
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minor than they would have if the minor had acted on his or her own behalf.39
As a consequence of these principles, plaintiffs who are injured in the
course of recreational services will be in a very different position depending
on whether they are minors (or presumably, otherwise incapacitated) or adults.
Contractual waivers will be binding against the latter, but not the former.
However, even if a contract of service is not binding upon the minor, none the
less the minor can sue for breach of such contract.40 Whether this means a
minor can also sue for breach of implied terms and continue to enjoy the
protection of s 74, despite the presence of a waiver clause, however, is a
doubtful proposition. It is likely the minor must either avoid the contract as a
whole, or enforce it as whole.41 Irrespective of whether a contract claim can
be brought, however, a minor should be able to proceed with a tort claim by
avoiding the contract containing the waiver clause.42
One way in which recreational service providers might seek to overcome
these difficulties when dealing with minors is to require parents to sign an
indemnity agreement. The terms of such an agreement would require the
parents to indemnify the provider against any damages or losses arising from
a claim by the minor against the provider. Obviously, if valid, such an
indemnity could significantly reduce the incidence of litigation against service
providers by minors. Although I am not aware of any Australian authority in
point, one must question the validity of any such indemnity; I suggest it is
contrary to public policy to deprive minors, in effect and for most practical
purposes, of their legal rights by such a backdoor means. As far as I am aware,
such indemnity agreements are not uncommonly used by recreational service
providers and, no doubt, litigation on their validity will be forthcoming.43
Valid waivers under the TPA: The problem in South
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia
South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have provisions equivalent to
s 74.44 These provisions apply to all service contracts with consumers,
whether the provider is a corporation or not. Hence, the State and federal
provisions have an overlapping sphere of operation. To the extent that there is
inconsistency between the State and federal legislation, the latter will prevail.
Whether, however, there is an inconsistency in a given case is not an easy
39 Harland, above n 34, at [508]–[509].
40 Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 34, at [17.34].
41 See Harland, above n 34, at [612]–[613].
42 Such a claim may be subject to State legislation limiting liability for recreational services
discussed further below, as well as arguments based on volenti arising from the
(non-contractually binding) waiver clause: see above n 22. In relation to the State
legislation, however, some of the provisions limiting liability may not have as onerous an
operation in relation to minors as with adults. For example, in a number of States plaintiffs
are presumed to be aware of obvious risks (and thus defendants have no duty to warn of such
risks) unless they can prove that they were not aware of the existence of the risk (eg, Civil
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 16(1)). I would assume that such a subjective test would make it
much easier for minors to overcome the presumption.
43 See, eg, the indemnity agreement for the ‘Bondi Beach Cole Classic’ surf lifesaving
carnival, at <www.coleclassic.com/terms> and cl 22 of the Australian Olympic Team
agreement, at <http://www.olympics.com.au/cp7/c9/webi/externaldocument/000534ad.pdf>.
44 See above n 19.
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question. The problem arises because of legislation in all three States that
allows recreational service providers to limit their liability for breach of the
implied terms of due care and skill, but on different terms from those of the
TPA. In Victoria, a recreational service provider may limit or exclude liability
for breach of the implied term, but such waiver cannot be relied upon if the
service provider’s act or omission was done ‘with reckless disregard . . . for
the consequences of the act or omission’.45 The WA provisions (yet to be
passed) are similar.46 In South Australia, a recreational service provider may
modify the duty of care owed to a consumer47 consistently with the
undertaking of reasonable measures that the provider has set out in a
registered code of practice governing the type of services.48 As at 10 July
2003, no codes had been approved or draft codes submitted.
The problem which arises is this (to use the Victorian legislation as the
example): what if a defendant corporation seeks to waive its liability for
negligence for recreational services provided to a plaintiff in Victoria, but the
plaintiff’s injuries were sustained as a result of the defendant’s ‘reckless’
conduct? Section 68B of the TPA would allow the defendant to exclude such
liability but the Victorian legislation, which also governs, would not. Is there
an inconsistency between the two provisions such that the TPA will prevail (as
a result of s 109 of the Constitution)?
Obviously this is not an easy question to answer. The starting point is the
High Court decision in Wallis v Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty
Ltd,49 in which the court has taken a broad approach to the question of
inconsistency between the TPA and State legislation in relation to s 74. In that
case, Queensland legislation limited the liability of a carrier of goods to a
certain monetary sum in specific circumstances. When goods were damaged
in transit, the plaintiff claimed more than such sum, relying on a breach of s 74
(and the non-excludability of such implied term by s 68). The High Court held
that the provisions of the Queensland legislation were inconsistent with s 74.
Section 74 carried with it a full contractual liability for breach which the
Queensland legislation sought to limit.50 This appears quite a broad approach
to inconsistency. Section 68 states that a term of a contract that limits liability
is void; it says nothing about State legislation having such effect. It could be
argued that s 74 implies one contractual duty, whereas the Queensland
45 Goods Act 1958 (Vic) s 97A; Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) s 32N. Forms for this purpose are
prescribed by the Goods (Recreational Services) Regulation 2003 (Vic).
46 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5K, especially subs (6) (as amended by the Civil
Liability Amendment Bill 2003 (WA), see above n 8).
47 Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) s 6. Interestingly, although the
Act appears clearly intended to allow waiver of liability, it is not clear that it successfully
achieves this aim even where a code has been registered. Section 6 refers to ‘modifying the
duty of care owed’ by the service provider. This could be interpreted as referring to tort
negligence claims and not necessarily to a claim for breach of a term of the contract to
perform the services with ‘due care and skill’ implied under the Consumer Transactions Act
1972 (SA) s 7 (the s 74 equivalent). This, however, would be an odd conclusion.
48 Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA) s 4(2). If the SA Law Reform
(Ipp Recommendations) Bill 2003 is passed then there will be no duty to warn of obvious
risks unless a recreational service code of practice is in force (see s 38(2)(b)).
49 (1994) 179 CLR 388; 120 ALR 440.
50 Ibid, at CLR 396 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ concurring).
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legislation merely limits the damages payable as a result of any breach of
contract. None the less, such arguments were not accepted by the High Court.
Even given the High Court’s broad approach to inconsistency, however, it
is not clear that the Victorian provisions are inconsistent with the TPA.
Section 68B allows for waiver clauses to be used and thus reinstates the
common law contract principles (namely freedom of contract) that are
otherwise disallowed by s 68. It does not stipulate that such clauses must be
used, nor that those clauses must exclude liability (as opposed, say, to merely
limiting it in certain circumstances). Arguably, then, the Victorian legislation
only places a limit on the common law right to waive liability for breaches of
contract. Hence, the Victorian corporate defendant will not be able to escape
liability for its reckless conduct.51 Obviously, however, the issue remains an
open one.
Of course, where the recreational service provider is not a corporation and
hence, the TPA does not apply, then the Victorian and SA legislation will
govern the situation and no issue of inconsistency will arise.
Further proposed amendments to the TPA
I would like to add to the confusion arising as a result of the operation of the
TPA, by foreshadowing another possible complication. Presently before the
Federal Parliament is the Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and
Death) Bill 2003. This Bill, if passed, will amend the TPA to preclude
damages for personal injury or death for breach of Div 1 of Pt V of the TPA.
This Division, importantly, includes s 52, which prohibits misleading or
deceptive conduct. The passage of this Bill could have quite startlingly harsh
consequences. At least two situations present themselves. First, consider a
defendant who misleads the plaintiff as to the extent and nature of the actual
risks involved in a particular recreational activity, which actual risks
eventuate. A well-drafted exclusion clause precludes a claim for breach of
contract (s 74 implied term) and in negligence generally. The new amendment
would seem to preclude any claim for breach of s 52 for the personal injuries
sustained and, unless perhaps the plaintiff could show common law fraud,
would presumably leave a plaintiff without any rights. Such a conclusion is
appalling, but appears difficult to circumvent.
The second situation which could arise is where a defendant misleads the
plaintiff as to the extent, meaning, or effect of a waiver clause in a contract.
Here the plaintiff’s position would not be as hopeless. The plaintiff could
alternatively: (1) rely on the common law to argue that the waiver is
ineffective or limited to the meaning represented by the defendant,52 or
(2) seek relief under s 87 to have the contract amended to comply with the
representation, or (3) could argue that he or she has suffered economic loss as
a result of breach of s 52 in entering a contract on terms which he or she
otherwise would not have (that is, that the loss is the right to sue for breach
51 If it were held that the Victorian provisions were not inconsistent with the TPA, could a
corporation providing recreational services in Victoria avoid the Victorian legislation by
stipulating, say, New South Wales to be proper law of the contract? Professor Jim Davis
suggested this possibility to me.
52 See above n 32.
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of contract which otherwise would have existed had the misleading conduct
not been engaged in, because a contract in different terms would have been
entered).
It should be added that unless State Fair Trading Acts are amended to also
incorporate such a change, claims against both corporate (assuming there is no
inconsistency with the TPA) and non-corporate defendants for breach of s 52
could continue under those Acts until such changes take place.
Let us turn, then, to the law as it applies to recreational service providers
who are not corporations, that is, who are not covered by the TPA. What is the
legal position relating to waivers, breach of contract and tort in such cases?
3. Cases in which the TPA does not apply:
Defendants who are not ‘corporations’
Introduction
Where the TPA (and hence s 74) does not apply, some of the difficulties
discussed above may none the less still arise in some States which have
enacted provisions equivalent to s 74. Even in those States which do not have
such equivalent provisions, however, there are still a number of other
difficulties and complexities. These will be discussed under the relevant State
headings. I will commence with a discussion of Victoria and South Australia
together, as they raise similar issues.
Victoria and South Australia
As already noted, Victoria and South Australia have provisions equivalent to
s 74. Consequently, in order to waive liability for breach of the contractual
implied terms, a valid and effective waiver would need to govern the contract
of service. This means that all the difficulties associated with contract law and
waivers discussed above apply equally in these States: that is, problems
associated with the incorporation of terms and their interpretation, as well as
the inability of service providers to bind minors to such waivers. Further, the
potential operation of waivers is limited in the ways noted above such that, in
Victoria, for example, liability for ‘reckless’ conduct cannot be waived.
If no effective waiver governs the service contract, then a breach of contract
claim will arise where the services are performed negligently. This means that
even if a tort claim is precluded because, for example, the (contractually
ineffective) waiver establishes a voluntary assumption of risk on the part of
the plaintiff, none the less the claim for breach of contract can proceed. If an
effective waiver does govern the contract of service then in most cases, one
would assume, such waiver will also preclude a tort claim.
Western Australia
Western Australia also has a provision equivalent to s 74.53 Under the yet to
be passed amendments to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA),54 liability for
breach of such term can be waived other than for ‘reckless’ conduct (s 5K).
53 Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) s 40.
54 As amended by the Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2003 (WA); see n 8, above.
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Hence, the legal position generally is the same as in Victoria, with one
possible difference. The difference may arise where a waiver is not effective
in excluding liability for breach of contract for recreational services. In such
a case, the question which arises is whether other limitations of liability
applying to recreational services under the Civil Liability Act 2002 still apply.
The Act excludes any liability for harm arising from ‘obvious risks’ occurring
during ‘dangerous recreational activities’ (s 5H) (that is, ones involving a
significant risk of harm (s 5E)).55 Further, where a ‘risk warning’ in respect of
a risk of a recreational activity has been given to an adult, then a service
provider does not owe a duty to take care in relation to such risk, either to an
adult participant or a child aged 16 or over of such adult or who is controlled
or accompanied by such adult (s 5J). Do these restrictions of liability apply
even in the absence of an effective waiver of an implied term of the contract
to take reasonable care? The answer is that they probably do. This is because
s 5A(2) states that the relevant part of the Act ‘applies to claims for damages
for harm caused by a person even if the damages are sought to be recovered
in an action for breach of contract or any other action’.
New South Wales
Perhaps the most restrictive of all the legislative regimes is that contained in
the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Since New South Wales does not have an
equivalent to s 74 of the TPA, there is no statutory implied term as to due care
and skill in service contracts. In any case, at common law defendants can
exclude their liability for both breaches of contract and in tort generally where
a contract of service is entered. This common law position is confirmed by
s 5N.56 Even in the absence of an effective contractual waiver, however,
recreational service providers are given wide protection under the Act.
Similarly to the position in Western Australia (but it must be stressed, the
relevant sections are not identical), the Act excludes any liability for harm
arising from ‘obvious risks’ occurring during ‘dangerous recreational
activities’ (s 5M) and where a ‘risk warning’ in respect of a risk of a
recreational activity has been given to an adult (s 5M) (which is also effective
against a child of any age or otherwise incapable participant who is controlled
or accompanied by such adult). Further, the NSW Act also denies any duty to
warn of an obvious risk (s 5H).
This raises the problematic question of what, precisely, is an obvious risk?
Section 5F states:
(1) For the purposes of this division, an obvious risk to a person who suffers harm
is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person
in the position of that person.
(2) Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge.
(3) A risk of something occurring can be an obvious risk even though it has a low
probability of occurring.
55 Problems as to the meaning of ‘obvious risk’ will be discussed further below, under ‘New
South Wales’.
56 One issue that needs to be addressed is how s 5N inter-relates with the Contracts Review Act
1980 (NSW), under which a wide-ranging waiver may be held to render the contract ‘unfair’
(see above n 17).
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(4) A risk can be an obvious risk even if the risk (or a condition or circumstance
that gives rise to the risk) is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.
At least three complications arise from this definition. First, since the test
is stated to be objective, can minors argue that as reasonable persons of such
age, they were not aware of the risk.57 More generally, this question is
complicated in relation to all plaintiffs by s 5G, which states that persons will
not be presumed to be aware of an obvious risk if they can prove they were
not aware of it. This seems to introduce a subjective element into the meaning
of obvious risk but, unfortunately, the section does not state how it
inter-relates with other sections utilising the term ‘obvious risk’.
The second complication is as follows: does the Act require merely that the
end result of an activity be an obvious risk (eg, falling off a horse) or must the
manner in which the risk materialised also have been obvious (eg, falling off
a horse after the service provider slapped its rump and the horse bolted). If the
latter interpretation is adopted, then the provisions will not be as unduly harsh
as they otherwise could be. If the former interpretation is adopted, then
defendants may escape liability for accidents (even if the result of their
negligence, even gross negligence) as long as that negligence led to an
‘obvious’ outcome. Interestingly, the Queensland drafters have foreseen the
problem and attempted to deal with it by incorporating into the definition of
obvious risk the following addition:
(5) To remove any doubt, it is declared that a risk from a thing, including a living
thing, is not an obvious risk if the risk is created because of a failure on the part of
a person to properly operate, maintain, replace, prepare or care for the thing, unless
the failure itself is an obvious risk.58
The third complication is the inherent vagueness of the concept of
‘obviousness’ and the considerable divergence of opinion that can legitimately
arise as to how widely or narrowly one formulates a particular risk. For
example, in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd, the majority (Gleeson CJ,
Hayne and Callinan JJ) treated the risk of being hit in the eye and suffering
serious injury while playing indoor cricket as ‘obvious’.59 The minority
(McHugh and Kirby JJ), by way of contrast, focused on the enhanced risk of
serious eye injury posed by the softness and size of the ball used, such as
would allow it to penetrate the eye socket. The latter risk, in their opinion, was
not ‘obvious’.60
Queensland and Tasmania
The positions in Queensland and Tasmania appear to be similar to that in New
South Wales with the exception that there is no provision dealing with ‘risk
warnings’ and, of course, the sections are not all identically drafted. For
example, as already noted above, Queensland has clarified the meaning of
obvious risk.
57 Comparably to the position at common law: eg, McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199;
[1966] ALR 513.
58 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13.
59 (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [34]–[36] per Gleeson CJ, [144] per Hayne J.
60 Ibid, at [80] per McHugh J, [126]–[131] per Kirby J.
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4. Conclusion
The legal position of recreational service providers seeking to exclude their
liability for negligently performed services is complex and uncertain. To try to
present an overview of this complexity and uncertainty, I have drawn the
following flow chart. The chart deals with the situation in which a defendant
recreational service provider has performed services without due care and
skill, causing the plaintiff personal injury. The chart seeks to outline the
defendant’s liability in contract or tort (taking into account State and federal
legislation modifying such liability rules), in particular where questions arise
as to the effect of any waiver clause. Obviously, the flow chart is a
simplification, and the notes below need to be considered.
* The waiver must form part of the contract and its wording must apply
to the relevant conduct.
** I am treating South Australia’s legal regime as the same as those of
Victoria and Western Australia in relation to waivers, for the sake of
simplification. If the Law Reform (Ipp Recommendations) Bill 2003
(SA) is passed, then there will be no duty to warn of an obvious risk
unless a recreational service code of practice is in force (s 38(2)(b)).
*** In Western Australia, other limiting principles relevant to recreational
services probably govern and will preclude liability if applicable (see
above under ‘Western Australia’).
# The State provisions in relation to obvious risks may in some
circumstances also be applicable to minors. See above n 42.
Liability for personal injuries arising from recreational services 259
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 66 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 11 10:16:46 2003
/journals/journal/tlj/vol11pt3/part_3
260 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 67 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Nov 11 10:16:46 2003
/journals/journal/tlj/vol11pt3/part_3
As can be seen from the ‘simplified’ flow chart, the legal framework is
complex almost to the point, I suggest, of being unworkable. In part, this
stems from the reform process having been given momentum by the Ipp
Report. In my view, the process was always going to be flawed. This is
because the process by which the Ipp Report’s conclusions and
recommendations were reached was fundamentally compromised from the
outset. The Ipp Report noted that:
the Terms of Reference . . . indicate that there is a widely held view in the Australian
community that there are problems with the law stemming from perceptions that
[among other things] . . . the law of negligence as it is applied in the courts is unclear
and unpredictable [and that] . . . it has become too easy for plaintiffs in personal
injury cases to establish liability for negligence on the part of defendants.61
Importantly, however, the Ipp Report acknowledges that it did not test the
accuracy of these community perceptions, but took ‘as the starting point for
conducting [the] inquiry the general belief in the Australian community that
there is an urgent need to address these problems’!62 That is surely a
tendentious basis for recommending sweeping reforms to the law.
Views will differ, of course, as to the merits of the process of reform.
However, few would disagree with the conclusion that the end result of that
process (if, indeed, the end stage has been reached) in relation to recreational
services, at least, has not been a success judged on the criteria of consistency
and simplicity. Since the insurance industry itself bears much of the
responsibility for initiating the reform, one can only hope that the insurance
industry, at least, is happy. I very much doubt it.
61 Ipp Report, above n 1, p 25, § 1.6 (emphasis added).
62 Ibid, p 26.
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